State of Utah v. Richard I. Cintron : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
State of Utah v. Richard I. Cintron : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and Earl F. Dorius; Attorneys for 
Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Cintron, No. 19149 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4720 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RICHARD I. CINTRON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
19149 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, FELONIES 
OF THE FIRST DEGREE, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., Esq. 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Fi LED 
NOV 31983 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RICHARD I. CINTRON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
19149 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, FELONIES 
OF THE FIRST DEGREE, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., Esq. 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT Of THE NATURE Of THE CASE--------------- l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT-------------------- l 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT 
TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION------------------- 5 
POINT II: THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTION 
CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PRIOR 
THEFT CONVICTION WAS PROPER-- 9 
POINT III: APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED 
BY THE CLOSING ARGUMENT OF 
COUNSEL FOR CO-DEFENDANT----- 10 
CONCLUSION--------------------------------------- 12 
TABLE Of CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Dean v. State, 430 So.2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
(1983)---------------------------------
State v. Brafford, Utah, 663 P.2d 68 (1983)------
State v. Carden, 650 P.2d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)-
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 
(1974)---------------------------------
State v. Jolley, Utah (Case No. 18559, filed 
July 6, 1983)--------------------------
State v. Johnson, 666 P.2d 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1983)----------------------------------
State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 (1980)-----
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980)---------
State v. Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1981)------
State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983)-------
Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033 
(1928)---------------------------------
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978)-----------------
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978)-----------------
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1982)------------------
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953)------------------
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 21------------------
3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 523 (1975)------
-i-
12 
6 
10 
12 
6 
10 
6 
6 
12 
6 
12 
1 
1 
2 
10 
9,10 
11 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
19149 
RICHARD I. CINTRON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Richard I. Cintron, appeals his 
convictions for Aggravated Burglary, a felony in the first 
degree, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and Aggravated 
Robbery, also a felony in the first degree, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of both offenses in a 
jury trial held November 22, 23, and 24, 1982. Appellant 
was sentenced to serve five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgments 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 1982, the 
victim, William Parker, who lived alone in his home at 11760 
South State Street in Sandy, Utah, was awakened by his dog. 
Parker then heard the sound of the back screen door shutting 
and went to investigate (Tl. 12-14, 35). He turned on the 
kitchen lights, which consisted of three large, base 100-
watt globe lights (Tl. 13, 38). The porch wall light outside 
next to the back door and the overhead light in the middle 
of the porch were also on (Tl. 36-37). Parker looked 
through the window sheers and saw a man, whom he identified 
as appellant, standing on the back porch (Tl. 14, 36). 
Parker immediately recognized the man as the 
"Spanish-looking" young man who had come to his house on 
three occasions during the previous three days. Parker had 
first seen appellant early the morning of July 23, 1982, 
when appellant had come to Parker's house asking for 
gasoline (Tl. 15, 10, 143, 145-146). Parker had had no 
gasoline and had sent appellant to his sister's house, next 
door to his, approximately 150 yards to the north (Tl. 15, 
142, 146). Parker had next seen appellant in the late 
afternoon of that same day, when appellant came by just to 
talk. Parker had last seen appellant at approximately 10:00 
p.m. on July 25, 1982, when appellant knocked at Parker's 
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door, wanting Parker to let him come in and talk. Parker 
had refused (Tl. 16). 
Because Parker recognized that it was appellant on 
his back porch the morning of July 26, 1982, he opened the 
door slightly and asked appellant what he wanted. Appellant 
said, "I am scared; I am scared," and tried to push his way 
into the house (Tl. 17, 36, 56). Parker held appellant out 
and asked what he was afraid of. Appellant replied, "This," 
and appellant's blond accomplice came into view and kicked 
the door open with both feet, knocking Parker to the floor 
(Tl. 18, 39-41, 55-58). 
The blond man, who was holding a knife, rolled 
Parker over onto his stomach, stomped on Parker's back and 
head with his feet, and threatened to cut Parker's throat 
(Tl. 18-20, 40-42). When Parker's dog barked at the 
intruders, distracting them, Parker attempted to wrestle the 
knife away from the blond man, and as a result Parker's hand 
was severely cut (Tl. 20). 
Appellant's accomplice then blindfolded Parker, 
and they took him into the bedroom, where they tied him upon 
the bed (Tl. 20-22, 41-42). During this time, Parker heard 
the blond man call appellant "Gary" several times, but later 
Parker heard the blond man call appellant "Rich" (Tl. 23, 
45, 49-52). Parker testified that he heard just the one 
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word, "Rich," and "[t]hen something about going and getting 
something" (Tl. 50). 
After the two men left, Parker untied himself, 
walked over to his sister's house, and told his brother-in-
law, Wayne C. Dahl, to telephone the police and tell them he 
had been robbed (Tl. 23-24, 74-75). Dahl asked Parker who 
had robbed him. Parker answered, "Well, one of them is the 
same guy that run out of gas that night, come and got gas" 
(Tl. 24 I 75). 
Dahl remembered appellant as the one who had come 
for gasoline on the morning of July 23, 1982. After going 
to Parker's house, appellant had gone to Dahl's house to ask 
for gasoline (Tl. 15, 71, 142, 146). Dahl had given 
appellant a can of gasoline, and appellant had paid for the 
gasoline and left his driver's license with Dahl as security 
for the can. Dahl remembered that the name "Richard 
Cintron" appeared on the license and that his birthday was 
October 28, 1957. October 28th is the Dahls' wedding 
anniversary (Tl. 72-73, 142-143). Thus, when Dahl 
telephoned the police, he described the two men as Parker 
had described them to him and gave them appellant's name as 
one of the burglars (Tl. 76, 81-82). 
After Parker had been treated for his wound, he 
returned to his home and discovered that his microwave oven 
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and five of his guns had been taken (Tl. 25). None of the 
stolen items have been recovered (Tl. 44). 
Later that same day, July 26, 1982, Draper Chief 
of Police F. R. Long showed the victim a photo lineup 
consisting of photographs of six individuals, one of whom 
was appellant. Parker unhesitatingly pointed to appellant's 
photograph, saying, "That's the one." (Tl. 356). 
Appellant was arrested August 26, 1982 (R. 16). 
He was tried by jury in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County on November 22, 23, and 24, 1982. 
Appellant presented a defense of alibi (R. 75, 92-93). The 
jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated Burglary and 
Aggravated Robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
Appellant claims that the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to support his convictions for 
Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Robbery. In considering 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
conviction, this Court has always applied the following 
standard of review. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence [viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict] is 
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sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt .•. 
State v. Brafford, Utah, 663 P.2d 68 (1983), quoting 
State y. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983), brackets in 
original. In State y. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 
(1980), the Court also stated: 
It is the defendant's burden to 
establish that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or insubstantial that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime charged. 
.IJ;l. at 1168, emphasis added. In addition, in a recent 
decision, this Court reaffirmed its deference to conclusions 
reached by the jury in matters solely within its province: 
It is the exclusive function of the Jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses, and it 
is not within the prerogative of the 
Court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the fact-finder. 
State y. Jolley, Utah (Case No. 18559, filed July 6, 
1983), quoting State y. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(1980). 
Appellant has not met his burden of establishing 
that the evidence against him was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 
Appellant conceded at trial that the victim's home 
had been burglarized and that the victim had been robbed. 
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Appellant claimed only that the victim was mistaken as to 
the identity of the perpetrators of the crimes (Tl. 10-11). 
The evidence pertaining to the victim's identification of 
appellant, however, established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant participated in the crimes. 
The victim, William Parker, immediately recognized 
appellant when he saw appellant on the back porch of his 
home on the morning of July 26, 1982. Parker had seen 
appellant three times during the previous three days (T2. 
15-16). Parker had a clear view of appellant at the time of 
the burglary through the sheer curtain. Three large, base 
100-watt globe lights were on in the kitchen, as were two 
porch lights, one on the outside porch wall in front of 
appellant and one on the ceiling of the porch above 
appellant (Tl. 14, 36-38). Parker was not wearing his 
glasses, but appellant stood only approximately three feet 
from him, and Parker testified that he has no difficulty 
seeing clearly at that distance. Parker only wears his 
glasses when he reads fine print or when his eyes are tired 
(T.l 6869). 
Later, the day of the crimes, Parker 
unhesitatingly identified appellant in a photo lineup 
prepared by Draper Chief of Police, F. R. Long (Tl. 97-99). 
Parker also positively identified appellant in court (Tl. 
17). Parker also testified at trial that he heard the blond 
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man once refer to appellant as "Rich" in connection with 
•something about going and getting something" (Tl. 23, 45, 
49-50, 52). 
His identification evidence was buttressed by the 
testimony of Wayne Dahl, the victim's brother-in-law. Dahl 
testified that Parker told him that one of the robbers was 
the person who had asked for gasoline three nights prior to 
the burglary (Tl. 24, 75). Dahl recalled appellant's name 
and birthdate from the driver's license appellant had left 
with him as security for the gasoline can (Tl. 72-73). Dahl 
also positively identified appellant at trial as the person 
who had purchased gasoline from him three nights prior to 
the burglary (Tl. 73). 
Appellant did not deny that he asked Parker and 
Dahl for gasoline on July 23, 1982, but he did deny 
returning to Parker's residence at any time after that 
morning (T.2 142-146). Appellant claimed that he was 
drinking with friends during the time Parker was robbed (Tl. 
128-135, 147-149, 152, 154-164). However, the prosecution 
rebutted appellant's alibi with the testimony of Dick 
Forbes, Investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office. Forbes testified that appellant's alibi witneses in 
an earlier conversation with him had been unable to account 
for appellant's whereabouts during the critical early 
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morning hours of July 26, 1982 (Tl. 173-177). 
By finding appellant guilty, the jury rejected 
appellant's alibi defense and accepted the victim's 
identification of appellant. The evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's finding, and reasonable minds could not 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. 
Therefore, the convictions should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTION CONCERNING 
APPELLANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTION WAS 
PROPER. 
The prosecutor asked appellant on cross-
examination whether he had "ever been convicted of a theft 
offense" (Tl. 152). Appellant's objection to the question 
was overruled (Tl. 152). Appellant claims this was error. 
Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
"Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not 
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be 
inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility, 
except as otherwise provided by statute.• 
1 Appellant objected to the State's calling Forbes as an 
alibi rebuttal witness because he had not been so listed in 
strict conformity with Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1982). The 
objection was overruled because the State had, in response 
to appellant's discovery motion, provided appellant with a 
copy of Forbe's report of the alibi statements made to him. 
Forbes' name appeared on the report. The court ruled that 
such constituted constructive compliance with the rule (Tl. 
169-171). 
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By implication, this rule permits the use of 
evidence of a crime that does involve dishonesty, regardless 
of classification, for the purpose of impairing a witness's 
credibility. Theft is a crime involving dishonesty. ~ 
y. Johnson, 666 P.2d 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); State y. 
Carden, 650 P.2d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). Therefore, it was 
not error for the prosecutor to question appellant 
concerning his prior theft conviction. 
As noted by appellant in his brief, Rule 21 by it 
terms does not apply where a statute provides otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953), provides that "a witness 
must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of 
felony.• Thus, a witness is required to answer questions 
concerning prior felony convictions, including questions 
concerning felony convictions ~ involving dishonesty or 
false statement, evidence of which would otherwise be 
inadmissible under Rule 21. While this statute, when read 
in connection with Rule 21, does not permit questions 
concerning misdemeanor convictions for crimes which did not 
involve dishonesty, it does not preclude questions 
concerning misdemeanor convictions for crimes such as theft 
which do. Thus, the question was proper. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE 
CLOSING ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR CO-
DEFENDANT. 
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In closing argument, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, 
counsel for co-defendant Joseph Price, commented on the 
strength of the State's case against appellant and suggested 
that his accomplice was alibi witness James McCall and not 
her client (T2. 35-37). Appellant objected to this line of 
argument, but did not move for mistrial or severance. The 
ObJection was overruled because the court ruled it could not 
restrain counsel from arguing the evidence (T2. 35). 
Appellant contends this was error. 
"Great latitude is accorded counsel in presenting 
his closing argument. He is allowed to summarize and 
discuss the evidence adduced and to draw reasonable 
inferences therefrom, with a view toward assisting the jury 
to analyze and evaluate the evidence." 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 523 (1975) (emphasis added). In the case at 
bar, counsel for codefendant Price merely discusssed the 
evidence against appellant and argued that it could be 
reasonably inferred from the evidence that appellant's blond 
accomplice was alibi witness McCall and not her client. 
Thus, this line of argument was within the permissible scope 
of closing argument. 
Furthermore, appellant was not prejudiced by the 
mere fact that counsel for co-defendant implied that 
appellant was guilty because the remarks could not 
reasonably have affected the verdict • .s..e.e_., .e.....g_,_, 
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State y. Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1981); Dean y, 
~. 430 S.2d 491 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1983). The 
evidence of appellant's identity was overwhelming, such that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would 
have been different absent co-counsel's comments. State y. 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), Also, 
because co-defendant Price was also found guilty, it is 
obvious that the jury was not persuaded by the argument. 
Thus, appellant was in no way prejudiced. 
Workman y. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033 
(1928), cited by appellant, is not on point. In Workman 
counsel commented that he had personal knowledge of the 
credibility of certain witnesses. In the instant case, 
counsel for co-defendant did not claim personal knowledge as 
to any matter but merely discussed the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom. 
Therefore, the argument of counsel for the co-defendant was 
permissible. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence supported appellant's convictions. 
Appellant's identity as one of the burglars was established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim's identification of 
appellant was certain and consistent. No other issue was 
disputed at trial. 
It was not improper for the prosecutor to 
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question appellant concerning his prior theft conviction 
because theft is a crime involving dishonesty. Also, the 
arguments of counsel for appellant's co-defendant were not 
improper. Furthermore, appellant was not prejudiced by 
counsel for the co-defendant arguing the evidence because 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the result of the 
trial would have been different absent such remarks. 
Therefore, the convictions should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ~{~~day of 
~ftk~~~-----' 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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